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Abstract
I present 3 arguments that the laws of physics, by themselves, cannot explain the origin of
phenomenal consciousness. First, physics investigates the objective, while consciousness is
subjective. Second, the laws of physics are syntactical, while consciousness is semantic. Third,
the concept of consciousness cannot even be dened in terms of physics.
1. Introduction
The (in)famous hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996) is the idea that the problem
of explaining subjective phenomenal consciousness (also known as qualia) is a much more
dicult problem than scientists usually think. According to this idea, even if cognitive sciences
can explain how the brain works, it is very unlikely that it will explain why the brain has
subjective experiences.
Not surprisingly, this idea is much more popular among philosophers than among scientists.
While many philosophers of mind nd this idea very attractive, or at least worthwhile of a
serious consideration, most scientists seem to either ignore it or dismiss it with a contempt.
In my opinion, scientists ignore or dismiss it not because there is a good scientic evidence
that the idea is wrong, but because the idea is not explained in a form which most scientists
would nd convincing. With a motivation to alleviate this deciency, in this paper I defend the
same basic ideas as those in (Chalmers, 1996), but I use dierent arguments, which, hopefully,
might better resonate with typical reasoning of scientists. I present my arguments as three
short scientic essays, each of which presents some arguments that subjective consciousness
cannot be explained by an objective science such as physics.
2. What is hard about the problem of consciousness?
Before I start to deal with the problem of consciousness, let me rst deal with another
concept, which will later serve as an example. Let me deal with the concept of complexity.
What is complexity? Can complexity be scientically dened? Can physics explain com-
plexity? Can complexity be measured?
My answer is { yes and no.
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I have two answers because complexity has two components: objective and subjective. The
subjective component is when we look at something and have a feeling that it looks \com-
plex". The objective component is, for instance, when we quantify complexity by entropy (e.g.
algorithmic entropy), which is a measure of complexity that can be computed and measured
(Mitchell, 2009).
The key assumption (which I cannot prove but I take it for granted as something that seems
obvious to me) is that physics (or some similar science) can dene, explain and measure only
the objective component of complexity. The subjective component cannot be dened, explained
or measured by objective science such as physics.
But complexity is just one of many examples. There are many other concepts (e.g. the
concept of life, the concept of justice or the concept of beauty) which have both an objective
component and a subjective component. Physics, in general, can dene, explain and measure
only the objective component. The subjective component is not a subject of physics and similar
sciences.
Now let us turn our attention to the concept of consciousness. Just like many other concepts,
consciousness also has two components: objective and subjective. By that criteria, there is
nothing special about consciousness. I believe that physics, in principle, can dene, explain
and measure the objective component of consciousness. But the point is that it cannot do that
with the subjective component.
But if this is so, then what makes the problem of consciousness harder than other problems
in science?
The answer is that the problem of consciousness is not harder. Instead, it is more important!
Why more important? Here is why. In general, the problem of understanding the subjective
component is about equally hard for all the concepts that have such a component. A man would
like to understand the subjective components of all these concepts, but he cannot understand
them by physics or similar sciences. This is what makes those problems hard. But then a man
can try to think like this: If I cannot solve all these hard problems, can I at least reduce all
them to only one hard problem? For it is easier to deal with only one hard problem than with
many of them. So, is there one key hard problem, such that all other hard problems can be
reduced to that one key fundamental hard problem?
The answer is that there is. This is the so-called hard problem of consciousness, that is,
the problem of subjective component of consciousness. All the other problems of subjective
components of various concepts can be reduced to the problem of subjective component of
consciousness.
How do I know that subjective components of all those concepts can be reduced precisely
to the subjective component of consciousness, and not to a subjective component of something
else? The answer is obvious. This is because, in general, the subjective component of any
concept is a result of our subjective consciousness about that concept. Without subjective
consciousness there would be no subjective concept of justice, there would be no subjective
concept of beauty, etc. (Someone might object that without subjective consciousness there
would be no even objective concepts. But such objection, if correct, would only reinforce my
argument that subjective consciousness is something very important and fundamental.) The
subjective consciousness, therefore, is what makes subjective concepts subjective. All what is
subjective, is subjective precisely due to our subjective consciousness. Therefore, if there is
something to which all subjectivity can be reduced, then it is the subjective consciousness.
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This is why the problem of subjective consciousness is so important and fundamental.
To conclude, all the above can be summarized into 3 basic theses:
1. Some concepts have both an objective and a subjective component.
2. The subjective component cannot be studied by physics and similar sciences.
3. The origin of all subjective components lies in the subjective component of
consciousness.
From those 3 theses, the two main conclusions can be derived:
a) From 3. it follows that the problem of subjective consciousness is important and
fundamental.
b) From 2. it follows that the problem of subjective consciousness is hard because
it cannot be solved by physics and similar sciences.
3. A rened Chinese-room argument
In (Searle, 1997), Searle has presented a rened compact version of his famous \Chinese-
room" argument. His rened compact version of the argument is this:
1. Programs are entirely syntactical.
2. Minds have a semantics.
3. Syntax is not the same as, nor by itself sucient for, semantics.
Therefore programs are not minds. Q.E.D.
Concise, clear, and logically sharp! In other words - brilliant!
Now I would like to push forward this style of reasoning by myself, to show where that leads
us. First, let me prove an auxiliary lemma:
1. Physical laws can be faithfully represented by a program.
2. Programs are entirely syntactical.
3. Anything which can be faithfully represented by something entirely syntactical
is entirely syntactical itself.
Therefore physical laws are entirely syntactical.
Next, from this auxiliary lemma let me prove another lemma:
1. Physical laws are entirely syntactical.
2. Brains are entirely based on physical laws.
3. Anything entirely based on syntactical laws is entirely syntactical itself.
Therefore brains are entirely syntactical.
Finally, from the last lemma, my main theorem is straightforward:
1. Brains are entirely syntactical.
2. Minds have a semantics.
3. Syntax is not the same as, nor by itself sucient for, semantics.
Therefore brains are not minds. Q.E.D.
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What this argument shows is that, if one thinks of brain as a physical object entirely based
on physical laws, then such a view of the brain cannot explain the mind. To explain the mind
one needs something more, something beyond the laws of physics.
4. Denition of consciousness vs axiom of consciousness
By thinking about what exactly is missing in the existing theories of consciousness, I have
noticed that it is the most important thing { the denition of consciousness. How can any theory
explain the emergence of consciousness, if it did not rst dened consciousness the emergence
of which needs to be explained?
Someone will say that everybody knows what is consciousness, so that this concept does
not need a special denition. But this is not really so. Even though everybody knows what is
consciousness in the sense that he or she experienced it, for the purpose of scientic research of
consciousness such a knowledge is not adequate. If one wants consciousness to be scientically
explained, rst it needs to be scientically dened. For instance, if you want to derive con-
sciousness from the laws of physics, you must rst dene consciousness by using known terms
from physics. Likewise, if you want to derive it from the principles of cybernetics, you must rst
dene it in terms of cybernetics. A serious deciency in the existing theories of consciousness
(that I have seen) is that consciousness is not precisely dened at all. Neither in physical terms,
nor in cybernetic terms, nor even in psychological terms. It is not precisely dened at all.
By further thinking about that problem I have concluded that the hard problem of con-
sciousness is precisely the fact that consciousness is hard to dene. Whatever denition I try,
I either
 nd that I must use an equally vague word (e.g. to dene \consciousness" I use an equally
vague word \aware"), or
 arrive at a denition that does not really correspond to the phenomenal subjective con-
sciousness that I wanted to dene.
Eventually I concluded that the concept of consciousness must be a primitive concept which
cannot be dened. And what cannot be dened, cannot be explained. It must be accepted
as such, as something so fundamental that it cannot be derived from something even more
fundamental.
But consciousness is not the only such concept. Such primitive concepts which cannot be
dened exist even in the most exact science { mathematics. For instance, the concept of \set"
is one such concept, the meaning of which in mathematics is accepted intuitively, without
giving a rigorous denition (Halmos, 1974). Besides being primitive, the concept of set is also
fundamental, in the sense that all other branches of mathematics can be formulated as special
cases of set theory.
Let me emphasize one particularly important consequence of the fact that set in mathematics
is not dened. The important consequence is that no mathematician attempts to explain the
origin of sets or to prove that sets generally exist. Likewise, if consciousness is also one such
primitive concept, then it also should not be tried to be explained or proved. The best one can
do is to include consciousness into a complete scientic theory of mind (or of nature).
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In the set theory it looks like this. After an intuitive explanation of the concept of set (but
without a rigorous denition of set) one gives a list of several basic axioms (Hrbacek and Jech,
1999), all of which sound plausible, but neither of which can be proved. Only after giving those
axioms one can start to prove some claims about sets. (The claims that are proved are called
theorems.)
The fundamental laws of physics, which cannot be derived from anything more fundamen-
tal, also have a form of axioms. So if physics has its axioms, I do not see why a theory of
consciousness could not introduce its own additional new axioms which do not exist among the
axioms of physics. In fact, the more I think about that, the more it looks plausible to me that
introducing (at least) one such axiom is { necessary. I do not think that consciousness can be
derived from the laws of physics, as I already said, simply because consciousness cannot even
be dened by using only the concepts from physics.
When I think that way, it seems to me that the hard problem of consciousness is no longer
so hard as it used to be. It is hard (actually, unsolvable) only if one stubbornly insists that
consciousness must be derived from already existing axioms, such as those of physics. Once
one realizes that one can (and must) step out from the framework of physics and add at least
one axiom of consciousness that cannot be found in the known laws of physics, it seems that it
should no longer be so prohibitively hard. If it is considered that the theory of consciousness
should be formulated in a similar way as theories in physics and mathematics, I think that one
such axiomatic approach should be the right way.
Of course, it does not mean that such an axiomatic approach would be easy. If you want
to ask me what such an axiom of consciousness would be, I have to confess that I don't know
(yet). If you have any good idea, please let me know!
Acknowledgements: I am very grateful to Danko Nikolic for numerous discussions, during
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